This paper is a conceptual sndy of trade-offs and compromises, both/rom the perspective of their formulation at the strategic level and of their daily use in worl<shops. It suggests tools that can be used for better compromise rnanagement within organizations. This paper makes four propositions: (1) trad.e-ffi are aform of comman lvwwledge embedded and encultured in organizational systems, (2) trade-offs form configuration that are time-and context-sensi' tive, (3) configuration ta.bles presented in this paper are one way of m.odelling the contextual sensitivity and the conncctivity of trad.e-offs, and (4) cladistics classification is one way of modelling the dynarnic structure of trad.e-offs, These propositions are illustrated by an in' depth case study and by a survey of the hand tool industry.
I.INTRODUCTION
Trade-offs in operations strategy axe currently the subject ofnew conceptual studies, led primarily by Slack (1998) and Da Silveira and Slack (2001) . Trading-offmeans to balance two situations against each other in order to get an acceptable result. In consftast, a compromise is an agreement between two people or groups in which both sides agree to accept less than they first asked for and to give up something they value. In other words, in every compromise there is the expression of one or several trade-offs by individual parties. Consistently with Da Silveira and Slack (2001) , the objective of this paper is to propose tools and techniques for managing tadeoffs in various situations This paper is primarily conceptual, although the propositions that are formulated are illustrated with one in-depth case study and data from another research project, not initially designed to study trade-offs. tr. LITERATURE REYIEW Trade-offs in d.ecision Science Trade-offs are commenly discussed in decision science. However, trade-offs are typically discussed and modelled in specffic situations, e.g. an economic order quantity model. For example Roemer, Ahmadi and Wang (2000) modeled the trade-off between product development time and costs to select optimal overlapping strategies between the design and the development stages. Another example is a study of the trade-off between inventory levels and the delivery leadtime offered to customers in achieving atarget level ofservice (Glasserman and W*g, 1998) . Although examples of research papers focusing on fade-offs could be multiplied in this paper, there has not been in decision science any conceptual work attempting to build a "theory of tradeoffs". However, the decision science literature on trade-offs can easily be presented in two categories:
. Optimization problems with a monetaxy objective function . Preference modelling problems
In the first case, op 'mization problems, the problem of decision makers is to position themselves at an optimal point defined as a minimum cost or a maximum profit point. For example, in the economic order quantity model, the objective is to find the best combination between setup costs and inventory carrying costs. As inventory carrying costs decrease setup costs increase automatically, but the rate of decline of carrying costs is higher than the rate ofincrease of setup costs up to the optimal point. This later property is no0eworthy as it indicates clearly that in this first class of trade-off problem, there is no ambiguity nor uncertainty regarding the trade-off. What is being reduced -+arrying costs-offsets what is being increased, and these changes are measured.
In the second case, decision makers are faced with the additional diffrculty of dealing with non homogenous and conflicting objectives. The investor's dilemma is the most standard example: achieving a high return on investment is desirable, as is taking little risk when investing. However, low risk investments bring low returns, and high returns only come with high risk. The concept of expected monetary value (typically derived from a decision tee) can be used as a benchmark for decision paking in some simplified situations (dominance). However, in the most general case, to make a decision requires to exprcss one's preference befween two or more conflicfing objectives, which necessitates the combination of different scales: e.g. a return in percent and a measure of risk. It is for this purpose that utility functions are introduced in a decision model: their goal is to expresse on a single scale the utility associated to different alternatives, and to select the highest utility alternative. In its most simple form, an additive utility function can be used between several conflicting objectives in a situation of risk neutrality. For more subtle situations where risk postures are non neutral (e.g. risk aversion), more advanced utility functions can be used: this is the field of multiatfibute utility theory (MAI-)-D. Clemen and Reilly (2001) provides a good survey of utility functions and their application to decision making. Although utility functions are the theoretical solution for decision making problems involving fiade-offs between different decision variabes, their formulation and use is based on a number of assumptions. Research by cognitive psychologists has shown that in the most general case, decision makers make decisions in a way that is not consistent with the assumptions legitimizing the use of utility functions. For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) presented two key issues: . Framing effecf adecisionmakerrisk attitude can change depending on the way the problem is presented. . Certainty effecl 'individuals tend to place too much weigh on certain outcome relative to uncertain outcomes.
Trade-offs in Operations Stralegy
As in the case of the decision science literature. trade-offs have been discussed for long in the operations strategy literature, but rarely as such, i.e. for the purpose of developing a theory of trade-offs. In his literatue review about trade-offs in operations sfategy, Slack (1998) identifies three different schools ofthought:
. Traditionalists, based on the work of Skinner, hold that it is impossible to be good at everything, and thus, positioning and trade-offs in operations strategy are essentially the same thing. Both consist in choosing the best alternative in a situation of limited resources and capabilities. . Managers decide to focus on a specifc trade-off on the basis of two key criteria: the nade-off sensitivity is the potential to improve one element of performance by changing the other. The tade-off rigidity is the diffrculty of making a change.
Managers prefer to address sensitive, non rigid trade-offs. Slack mentions another criteria, fte importance of the trade-off (ie. its imFact on strategy), but his study allowed no conclusion regarding the relevance of this criteria. . Managers confirmed that the trade-off concept was useful in terms of dealing with complex and inter-related strategic decisions, and more especially to analyze and discuss the "downside"' of selected strategic directions.
An important debate in operations strategy is that related to the existence of trade-offs. In a different survey, Szwejczewski, Mapes, and New (L997b) ranked the performance of 782 manufacturing plants from the UK along several factors in order to discover which pair of performance measures formed hade-offs. The result of this survey is that a number of performance measures (value added per employees, delivery reliability, lead time, rate of new product introduction) are correlated with one another, indicating a consistency/complementarity between these objectives. Negative corelations, and thus the existence of trade-offs, were only observed for plants characterized by a broad product variety. The conclusion of the authors is that by organizing operational units with narrow product ranges, trade-offs can be avoided.
Although these research results give some weight to the thesis that trade-offs are illusions, other confirm the existence of fradeoffs. Bayus (1997) developed a model of the performance trade-off between speed-tomarket and new product introduction. His model allows to specify an ideal trading-off strategy in different contexts. In the field of supplier selection a number of studies have used quantitative tools to model preferences and trade-offs: conjoint analysis (Tice et al., 1996) and data envelopment analysis @ra-glia and Petroni, 2000). Koste and Malhotra (2000) analyzed trade-offs among the elements of flexibility in the automotive indusfry. Their conclusion is that even in a similar indusfiy, companies from different countries adopt very different strategies to developing their manufacturing fl exibility.
Despite the controversy surrounding tradeoffs, Da Silveira and Slack (2001) continued the analysis initiated by Slack (1998) and explored further the trade-off context. Their research is based on 5 case studies of companies based in the UK and Brazil. From these case studies, they formulate 12 propositions regarding trade-offs: 1. Manufacturing trade-offs do exist. In different company, it is clear that the hade-off will differ in criticality, importance, rigidity, etc. For instance, the trade-off will be different for the inventory of supplies in the automotive industry and the inventory of perishable goods in the food processing industry. This difference, and the extent to which processes, technologies and capabilities are used to address the trade-off is the pivot of the trade-off. In decision science, it is the expression of the cost functions for carrying inventory and ordering/setting up. The pivot represents how the elements of the base are combined with one another.
Finally, the function of the trade-off describes what is the impact on performance and models the marginal rate of substitution. In decision science, this rate is always stated, either as the (variable) slope of the total cost function in the case of the inventory tradeoff or within a utility function. However in operations strategy the marginal rate of substitution is rarely stated: it is qualitatively understood that it is positive or negative.
Trade -offs and Quantitativ e M oilels In the previous section, qualitative and quantitative trade-offs were reconciled. There are no major differences between the model suggested by Da Silveira and Slack and a typical model built in decision science. This leads to the following question: should we build a decision science model. and attach quantitative values to base, pivot and function systematically? The advantages of doing so are obvious in the context of this paper with the objective of facilitating compromise management within operational units. If a trade-off decision is modelled, structured, and the marginal rate of substitution known" tlrere can be no disagreement on to what constitutes the ideal strategic compromise fqr an organization.
That this approach would be beneficial cannot be questioned, as the positive impact of decision science models at the strategic level has already been established, for instance by Krumm and Rolle (1992) of trade-offs is confirmed by five propositions of Da Silveira and Slack. Da Silveira and Slack report that different trade-offs may have common or similar sources, effects or management strategies. This reveals of problem of connectivity between trade-offs: a cost/quality trade-off decision (either to prefer qualrty or to increase quality capabilities) has an impact on a lead time/punctuality of delivery trade-off. The potentially high connectivity between trade-offs decisions is not addressed by decision science model when trade-offs are studied in isolation (it is if multi attribute utility theory is used). However, at the sfrategic level, the overall integration of the decision made need to be taken into account. The notion of trade-off connectivity is consistent with Da Silveira and Slack's observation that trade-offs are mo. re easily observed in low complexity manufacturing systems. An additional issue is that some fade-offs are seen by managers as existing more in people's perceptions than in realtty. This issue is addressed by the structuring phase when building a decision model, and as stated earlier, the group processes involved in this structuring can be expensive and time-consuming. What is noteworthy is the existence of considerable ambiguity regarding which tradeoffs are real and which frade-offs are perceived. This is reinforced by proposittonZ. which stresses that trade-offs can be expressed at different levels (between strategic goals and financial measures, between broad and specific objectives) and in different fashions. This means that there is a need for a better structuring of fade-offs decisions. For instance, if a company has decided to prefer quality over cost, it is important that in the organization, everybody agree on this choice and take it into account in daily operational decisions. This example shows that in the manipulation of the trade-off concept and in the formulation of organizational compromises, there is an aspect linked to shared knowledge and organizational culture. This paper proposes that to manage compromises and fade-offs, it is essential to realize that one is not only solving a decision problem but also building a social form of knowledge which forms the backcloth of operations' effectiveness.
The recent focus on knowledge management has resulted in a great number of classification and definitions of knowledge. A number of these deflnitions are usefirl to better characterize the knowledge that is manipulated through strategic trade-offs.
Collins (L993) broadly defines enculrured knowledge as knowledge linked to social groups and society, and points out that this knowledge is not explicit. Blackler (1995) refines this definition and presents encultured knowledge as knowledge related !o the process of achieving shared understanding, embedded in cultural systems, and likely to depend strongly on language, and hence to be clearly socially constructed and open to negotiations. Blackler also defines embedded knowledge as knowledge that resides in systemic routines, relies on the interplay of relationships and material resources, may be embedded in technology, practices, or explicit routines and procedures. Fleck (1997) provides a deflnition for meta-knowledge that encapsulates both concepts of encultured and embedded knowledge. Metaknowledge is embodied in the organization and is comFosed of general cultural and philosophical assumptions. It can be local or cosmopolitan and is acquired tlrough so= sialization. Blumentritt & Johnson (1999) . define common knowledge as knowledge that is accepted as standard without having been made formally explicit, often in the form of routines and practices. Common knowledge is learned through working in a particular context. In the rest of this paper, strategic trade-offs will be considered as a form of common knowledge, with the undertanding that this terminology highlights the following properties: o Common knowledge is embedded in practices, i.e. it is not necessarily formalized and it is not necessarily consciously applied. This means that ambiguity and dissent may surround common knowledge, especiatly in complex organizational systems. . Common knowledge is part of organizational culture. It is socially constructed, which means that its production may not be as rational and structured than one could expect. In a dysfunctional organiz411sn, it is likely that people disagree strongly on common knowledge. . Common knowledge is contingent: common knowledge is called upon by organizational members in a variety of situations to guide their actions. In some cases, recommended action may be clear. In other cases, it may be dfficult to apply cornmon knowledge.
Trade -offs C onfiguratio n In the previous section, strategic tradeoffs are presented as common knowledge to explain why they cannot be managed sold with a formal, explicit procedure. It explains why we need more than decision science models to manage trade-offs and compromises. Although describing tradeoffs decisions as a form of common knowledge helps to tackle the ambiguous nature of qualitative, socially-constructed trade-offs, the issue of understanding the connectivities between different trade-offs has not been addressed.
The second key proposition of this paper is that trade-offs form conflgurations. This means that i1 is impossible to manage tradeoffs in isolation but only in the context of an existin g confi guration.
Configuration theory is a field of organisational science that originated with the observation that typologies of strategy have never been related to structure Miller, 1986) . The attempts to do so gradually refuted the assumption that structure followed strategy, and the focus of researchers shifted to the discovery ofthe ties that unite strategy and structure. This led to the discovery that glven a particular strategy, there are only a limited number of suitable structures and vice versa. The concept of a configuration was born: " We use the term "organizational confi.gur&tiens" to denote any multidimensionol constellation of conceptually distinct characteristics that cornmonly occur together", (Meyer et al., 1993) .
Although the first configurations can be traced back to the work of structural theorists such as Mintzberg, Miles and Snow, the father of configurational theory is Miller.
Miller stresses two notions which are at the core of the essence of configurations: multidimensionality and congruence.
"We believe that elements of structure cohere within common configurations, as do those of strategy. Furtherrnore, these con'
figurations are themselves interlinked in that these are natural congruences between particular strategic, structural, and indeed environmerutal configurations", (Millea 1986 emphnsis added).
Recently, configuration theory has been recognized as emerging area in study in operations management @oyer et al., 2000), primarily because configuration models are well suited to studying complex, multivariate organizational phenoma. Thus, configuration models are well suited to adress the 8th proposition of Da Silveira and Slack, that is different trade-offs may have common or similar sources, effects or management strategies. In other words, when dealing with a tade-off decision, the identification of an optimal solution is constrained by the notion of congruence with an existing configuration. The basic idea of configuration theory is that one can look at organizational systems from a shategic or a structural perspective: what is revealed is the same configuration. Similarly, one can look at operational systems with "trade-offs glasses" and observe the sarne configuration.
Illustratian of Trade-offs as conftgaratian of commonknowledge
The concept oftrade-offs as configuration of cornmon knowledge is illustrated through a case study of a special project in a French company with a dual manufacturing activity. The first division dealt wittt precision machining. The second division assembled, tested and fine tuned customized production machines. The project at stake was managed in the second division. The company ini1ially staried as a precision machinist and built a reputation for quality sold at a reasonable premium. The second division was createdmuchlater andfaced a strong growth in sales, as customers appreciated the high quality and reliability of the machines.
rV. CASE STUDY BACKGROUI\D
Historically at the company, delayed delivery of custom machines was commonplace. Idle time occurred during production. The company recog:rized that-on-time delivery was a critical issue in maintaining a competitive advantage and that customers were putting an increasing pressure on the company to respect delivery dates. Thus, the time-based competition paradigm (Stalk, 1988) seemed perfectly appropriate as a strategic improvement direction for the custom machine division. However, timebased competition was initiatly formulated by consultants and academics for repetitive, make-to-stock manufacturing environments. To the company's management, the extent to which time-based competition would work in their non-repetitive, project-based, make-to-order manufacturing environment was not clear.
In the summer of 1994, a customer who wanted a meat-cutting machine approached the company. The company bidded FRF 150 000 with a twelve weeks lead-time. They won the bid but the order that was returned specified a deadline of three weeks. The order sat with no action initiated. A project manager saw the order three days later and recognised an opportunity to apply timebased competition principles. The project manager believed that in the company's extremelly competitive market on-time delivery could be the company's special niche.
Following renegotiations with the customer, the company and the customer mutually agreed to have the machine delivered in five weeks in return for a premium equivalent to ISVo of the oiginal bid pricb. The agreement confirmed a strong customer need regarding on-time delivery much to the surprise of the commercial division, which believed that the company could solely compete on cost and quality.
In order to meet the delivery date, the company changed the way the order was handled, and the project manager implemented the following practices:
He notified the pertinent departments of the deadline. This was to make sure that all involved parties would join in the challenge of delivering on time.
He took the risk of ordering parts and components known for their long lead times before the design was finished, to make sure that they would arrive in the factory when they were needed. In the original plan, the design phase was specifled as 6 weeks because the company did not have an experienced design engineer available for the first 4 weeks. The company decided to subcontract the design job. The contactual agreement stated that if the design was completed in one week, the company would pay the subcontractor FRF 16,200. If the design was completed in eleven days, the company would pay FRF 12,000. No payment would be made after the eleventh day. The desrgn engineer completed the job in one week.
Employees focused on the project as a team. They were informed of the deadline objectives and encouraged to communicate any problem likely to slow assembly immediately to the project manager. The project manager made the necessary design revisions on-the-fly, that is without sending blueprints back to another designer.
The machine was completed and delivered in five weeks. Based on this case, the company recognised that time is an important factor in the custom machine market. Customers were willing to pay a premium for expediency. The project also confirmed that shorter delivery time were possible with a sfeamlined work approach utilising teams. This apparent success was very temporary as three days after delivery the machine was returned to the factory for (1) violating the food processing industry health standards, (2) violating safety norms for machines including cutting tools, and (3) for a number of quality problems linked to the cutting tool. The machine was eventually revised and modified and sent back to the customer and met their specifications without any difficulties. A number of employees who has been critical of the TBC experiment used this quality failure to stress that short lead time and punctuality of delivery were impossible in their indusffry.
Case Analysis
The company top-management and project management were interviewed fi.ve years after the completion of project. No other attempts to replicate the TBC experiment were made by the company. Top management was interviewed about (1) what they believed were important trade-offs within the company before the TBC experiment and Q) after the TBC experiment.
The interview was semi-structured and asked managers to identify important trade-offs by matching generic strategic objectives: cost (C), punctuality of delivery (D), quality (Q), speed of delivery (S), and product range/variability (V). This research design is similar to the one used by Da Silveira and Slack (2001) purposefirlly, and primarily to guarantee some consistency between the managers that were interviewed.
The interviewees agreed that an extensively discussed tade-off was the one between quality and variability (QD. The interviewees had some degree of familiarity with their competition and they stressed that on some markets, they are often bidding against companies that have voluntarily reduced their product range to sell either a specffic type of process or a specific technology. In confrast to the focused innovation of these competitors, the interviewees declared that the consensus was not to offer semi-customized capital goods but products that were truly the fruits of a one-offproject. Tnstead ofpresenting itself as a designer and manufacturer of customized machines, the company preferred to indicate in its commercial brochure ttrat its mission was the delivery of engineered solutions for production operations. The interviewees indicated that there had been constant debates within the company as to whether or not it would preferable to adopt a focused innovation strategy (Sivaloganthin and Shahin, 1999) or to select one past innovative design and try to market it at a larger scale. They all agreed that the difficulty of delivering high quality machine came primarily from their exffemelly broad product range. However, they all agreed that the strategy of the company was to balance performance along both dimension: variability and quality.
$imilsxly, the cost/variety (CV) trade-otr was an important source of discussion within the company. The debate on this trade-off followed a parallel with the QV trade-off as managers agreed on the fact that if was the company was to reduce product variability, it would greatly simplif the issue of managing manufacturing cost. It would especially be less exposed to high technical risk when bidding, could capitalize more on learning curve effects, and would compete better on the cost dimension. However, the company compromise was to agree on apreferencefor variety over cost. Their strategy for dealing with the complexity resulting from preferring variety was addressed by implementing organizational processes targeting better bidding and investing in expert systems technologies to assist the bidding process (i.e. raising the base of the trade-off).
The third trade-off that was deemed impoltant by management before the TBC experiment was that between cost and quality (CQ. Given the preference for product variability, management belived that manufacturing cost and quality were dimensions that they could not target together. Management expressed a preference for quality, i.e. it was more important for them to maintain the quality/reliability image associated with their products than to compete primarily on cost. Management sfressed that this was an important fiade-off as most of their commercial engineers and commercial agents perceived that competing on cost was the priority. To deal with this deviation from objectives, management introduced an informal policy that price bids would only be revised if technical specifications were modified (i.e. a price decrease has to be justified by a decrease in specifications by the customer).
Before the TBC experiment, managers said that punctuality ofdelivery and speed ofdelivery were minor considerations, and not the subject of debates or discussions within the company. For example, the project manager who initiated the TBC experiment reported the following anecdote. When discussing with senior managers and other project managers and expressing his concern about the chronic delays of the company (in one case, a machine was delivered almost two years after the due date!), the other managers disagreed strongly with the notion that the company was performing poorly in terms of punctuality of delivery. When faced with the evidence, that is that the custom machine division never met a deadline, managers replied that delays did not originate in the company but were the results of change of specifications by the customer. Although this was an issue, there was no evidence or performance data to establish responsibility in delays.
A number of managers did not revise their perceptions of trade-offs after the TBC experiment. For them, the TBC experiment was a failure because the project was managed by a young, inexperienced project manager. For them, the company was performing well on punctuality and speed of delivery.
Other, including the project manager, had a different interpretation of the TBC experiment. These managers agreed that performance along the punctuality and speed of delivery had to be improved, especially for the sake of improving customer relationships and developing more long-term business relationships with them. A manager quoted the example of a large customer accepting to pay according to schedule to help the distressed cash position of the company despite the fact that the company was missing a deadline: it was through reassurance that the delay could be absorbed at the next process stage that the payment was authonzed.
What these managers learn from the TBC experiment was that:
. The tade-offbetween punctuality of delivery and speed of delivery is relatively unimportant. Working faster is possible tlrough a modification of work methods. Short lead times are more difficult but ns1 im.possible to manage. A key trade-off is the quality/speed of delivery (QS). In the TBC experiment, the project manager broke a latent tradeoff of the company. Given the complexity of the product, a trade-off embedded in the work practice of the company was to systematically prefer quality to punctuality of delivery. This means that employees regurlarly delayed a task for the purpose of assimilating the problem and reflecting upon it. When they feel confident that their approach was the best alternative, they did the job. With the TBC experiment, the project manager inverted this preference for quality. Although he managed to elicitate collaboration for the sake of meeting a short deadline, he did not elicitale any collaboration on the quality dimension. To what extent the cv failure of the TBC experiment is due to his lack ofexperienceo to resistance from work colleagues, or to fte impossibility of accelerating the completion of complex projects is open to debate. The key learning is that through his approach with the TBC experiment, the project manager moved away from a viable configuration to a non viable one, and revealed a tradeotr (QS) of importance, embedded in practices, that had never been perceived ss impofiant. It illustrates the difficulty of dealing with commonknowledge. The second reason is the constant tendency of managers to label trade-offs according to their perceptions. For instance, the project manager of the TBC experiment consistently talked about a knowledge teuse versus speed ofdehvery trade-off. In the case write-up above, ttris was described under the QS trade-offs. Clearly in the case of the project manager the precise labelling of the trade-off translates the frustation to have failed to reuse knowledge that was available within the company. The knowledge reuse/speed of delivery tade-off, although generic in the Engineered-to-Order industry, has little reason to be relevant in other industries. It remains however an interesting way of diagns5ing an operations problem.
Therefore, in terms of managing organizational compromises, it is doubtfrrl that a generic trade-offs scheme is feasible. The third proposition of this paper is that the use of configuration tables such as tables 1 and 2 do a good job to address the contextual sensitivity of trade-offs, and their connectivity, and therefore are a useful tool to manage organizational compromises.
Phyl.ogeny of Trafu-offi The benefits of using configuration tables is to treat trade-offs as configurations of common knowledge, and to taken into account their contextual sensitivity. However, configuration tables do not address the dynamic nature of trade-offs, i.e. their time sensitivrty. This is in fact a general critic of configuration theory as it usually ignores the evolution of systems from one configuration to another. In the case of the TBC experiment, time sensitivity is an important issue, as the project manager failed to understand that there was a cultural" embedded trade-offbetween quality and speed of delivery. Putting more emphasis on speed of delivery could be a viable strategy only to the extent that the trade-off rate between speed and quality is not too important. In other words, the project manager failed to incorporate lessons from the past when devising a new competitive strategy, and took the wrong "trajectory for improvement". Leseure (2000) presents the cladistics classification technique as a method to classify manufacturing systems as conflgurations (called organizational species) along a time dimension. The fourth proposition of this paper is that when managing organizational (Leseure, 2000) . Table 3 
